Putting Martinez to the Test: Tribal Court Disposition of Due Process by Freitag, Christian M.
Indiana Law Journal
Volume 72 | Issue 3 Article 7
Summer 1997
Putting Martinez to the Test: Tribal Court
Disposition of Due Process
Christian M. Freitag
Indiana University School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj
Part of the Indian and Aboriginal Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School
Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Indiana Law Journal by an authorized editor of Digital
Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
Freitag, Christian M. (1997) "Putting Martinez to the Test: Tribal Court Disposition of Due Process," Indiana Law Journal: Vol. 72 :
Iss. 3 , Article 7.
Available at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol72/iss3/7
Putting Martinez to the Test: Tribal Court
Disposition of Due Process
CHRISTIAN M. FREITAG*
I. INTRODUCTION
When many non-Indians think of Native Americans, they envision the
stereotypical eighteenth-century brave. Everyone knows the image: bow and
arrow, eagle feathers, long black hair. American popular culture has been
inundated with these images in media ranging from movies to textbooks.' Too
often, non-Indians lack the exposure to modem Indian culture necessary to
debunk the notion of Indians as largely a historical phenomenon. Native
Americans, while having lost vast tracts of land and enduring the policies of a
federal government frequently in conflict over the "proper" role for Indians in
American society, remain alive as a distinct cultural and politically autonomous
group. American Indian tribes, despite their socio-economic hardships, assert an
overwhelming desire to exist as self-determining polities.
Many tribes maintain a well-organized system of dispute resolution, often
modeled after the Anglo-American court system? The tribal courts play much the
same role in Indian societies, at least theoretically, as non-Indian courts play in
non-Indian society-dispute resolution and maintenance of social order. The way
in which tribal courts attain these results, however, need not mirror Anglo-
American society. Tribal courts do have the ability to act independently from
their American counterparts and function within Indian societies in culturally
sensitive ways.
In 1968, the United States Congress passed the Indian Civil Rights Act
("ICRA")3 in response to growing complaints about tribal governments abusing
the civil rights of their members. With its normative Anglo-American values
offended, Congress extended many of the Bill of Rights protections contained
within the U.S. Constitution to Indian individuals as protection against their
* Candidate for J.D., 1997, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington; B.A.,
1994, Northwestern University. First, and most importantly, I thank Professor David Williams
for his thoughtful and inspiring introduction to the field of Native American Law. I also thank
the Native American Rights Fund, in Boulder, Colorado, for providing me with many of the
resources that made this Note possible. Finally, special thanks to Jason Freitag, Philip R.S.
Johnson, and E. Paige Porter for their helpful comments and loving support.
1. For a recent example of such a stereotyped image, one need only look at the cover of
the popular and respected legal periodical, THE COMPLEAT LAWYER, Fall 1995 (picturing a
black and white, presumably old photograph of an Indian elder for an issue touted as
containing several articles on the culture of modern American Indians).
2. See infra notes 34-37 and accompanying text for a discussion of the establishment of
tribal courts. For a detailed discussion of tribal court systems, see SAMUEL J. BRAKEL,
AMERICAN INDIAN TRIBAL COURTS: THE COSTS OF SEPARATE JUSTICE (1978).
3. Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (1994).
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tribal governments.4 The United States Supreme Court, ten years after the
passage of the ICRA, decided the case of Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez,5 the
result of which was to preserve primary control over Indian civil rights claims
within Indian tribal courts, better equipped than federal courts to protect cultural
traditions and sovereignty. Even with Martinez's delegation of power to tribal
courts, the ICRA remains an imposition of Anglo-American values on Indian
societies, irrespective of tribal consent. The U.S. Supreme Court envisioned, in
Martinez, that tribal court disposition of civil rights would allow the tribes to
implement the ICRA in a manner which preserves their ability to decide difficult
questions in accordance with tribal values. Since the Supreme Court handed
down Martinez in 1978, much scholarship has been devoted to the debate over
whether tribal courts should be entrusted with civil rights protection.6 Currently,
however, no work has been done examining the actual tribal court opinions to see
how those courts have addressed civil rights claims.7 This Note will examine the
tribal courts' disposition of the due process clause contained within the ICRA8
and compare tribal interpretations with federal conceptions of due process.
Part II of this Note provides a broad overview of the field of Indian law, with
emphasis placed on the changing nature of tribal sovereignty in federal policy.9
Part III discusses the legislative history and enactment of the ICRA.' In Part IV,
the Note outlines the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Santa Clara Pueblo v.
Martinez." Part V explains the Project's methodology, discussing the difficulties
involved in researching tribal court opinions generally. 2 As a point of reference,
Part VI provides a cursory overview of the meaning of due process in the Anglo-
American tradition. 3 Part VII, the brunt of the Project, examines the tribal court
opinions of the Navajo Nation, the Colville Confederated Tribes, the Hoopa
4. Because the ICRA creates only statutory rights, Congress may alter these rights at any
time. David Williams, Legitimation and Statutory Interpretation: Conquest, Consent, and
Community in Federal Indian Law, 80 VA. L. REv. 403, 465 (1994). On this subject, one
commentator noted: "[tihe idea that Congress in 1968 had to bring the Bill of Rights to Indian
reservations by statute, and that Congress could pick and choose which constitutional
safeguards to extend, is alien to popular concepts of American jurisprudence." Arthur Lazarus,
Jr., Title II of the 1968 Civil Rights Act: An Indian Bill of Rights, 45 N.D. L. REv. 337, 338
(1969).
5. 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
6. See Robert C. Jeffrey, Jr., The Indian Civil Rights Act and the Martinez Decision: A
Reconsideration, 35 S.D. L. REV. 355 (1990); Joseph de Raismes, The Indian Civil Rights Act
of 1968 and the Pursuit of Responsible Tribal Self-Government, 20 S.D. L. REV. 59 (1975);
Alvin J. Ziontz, After Martinez: Civil Rights Under Tribal Government, 12 U.C. DAvIs L. REv.
1 (1979); John T. Hardin, Comment, Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez: Tribal Sovereignty and
the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 33 ARK. L. REV. 399 (1979).
7. Professor David Williams, commenting on the lack of scholarship on this point, noted,
"I know of no scholarly study surveying the tribal courts' work on this score. .. ." Williams,
supra note 4, at 497.
8. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(8) (1994).
9. See infra part II.
10. See infra part Il.
11. See infra part IV.
12. See infra part V.
13. See infra part VI.
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Valley Tribe of northern California, several Oklahoma tribes, and several tribes
from the State of Washington. 4 Finally, the Note attempts to draw conclusions,
based on the tribal court opinions, about the meaning of due process in a tribal
setting.' Ultimately, this Project shows that the Martinez vision-tribal courts
protecting tribal cultural traditions-has been successfully implemented, though
perhaps only at a conceptual level.
II. OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW AND THE NATURE
OF TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY
For hundreds of years, Indian tribes have shared a unique relationship with the
federal government. While Congress recognizes tribal sovereignty in some
respects, tribes remain subject to federal oversight and congressional power. An
understanding of any aspect of Indian law must necessarily begin with a
discussion of the status of tribes and tribal sovereignty in America.
The two-hundred-year relationship between the federal government and the
tribes has been marked most distinctively by its vacillation. At times, the federal
government has pursued a policy of self-determination for tribes; at others, the
federal government has encouraged assimilation as the proper course for Indian
policy. While either course of action may ultimately have proven a healthy one,' 6
vacillating federal support between sovereignty and assimilation has damaged
Indian cultures immeasurably. 7 Because of the federal government's inconsistent
dealing with the tribes, a concise statement of the modern status of tribal
sovereignty proves difficult. A brief outline of the sources of tribal sovereignty
may serve to preface a broader understanding of the current status and powers
possessed by tribes.
A. Tribal Sovereignty v. The Plenary Power of Congress
Early in the history of the United States, the Supreme Court attempted to
define the sovereignty possessed by Indian tribes in relation to the federal
government. In the case of Cherokee Nation v. Georgia," the Court described the
powers of the tribes:
[I]t may well be doubted whether those tribes which reside within the
acknowledged boundaries of the United States can, with strict accuracy, be
denominated foreign nations. They may, more correctly, perhaps, be
denominated domestic dependent nations. They occupy a territory to which
we assert a title independent of their will, which must take effect in point of
possession when their right of possession ceases. Meanwhile they are in a
14. See infra part VII.
15. See infra part VIII.
16. This Note deliberately shies away from either value judgment. Purely for the record,
however, this author unambiguously and unwaveringly supports tribal sovereignty as the
healthiest course for the preservation of Indian cultures.
17. See generally VINE DELORIA, JR. & CLIFFORD M. LYTLE, THE NATIONs WITHIN: THE
PAST AND FUTURE OF AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY (1984) (discussing the remarkably
inconsistent federal policy regarding the status of tribes).
18.30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
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state of pupilage. Their relation to the United States resembles that of a ward
to his guardian. 9
According to Chief Justice Marshall, the tribes were "domestic" in the sense that
they were located within the geographical borders of the United States, while
"dependent" in the sense that they had only limited authority.20 Cherokee Nation
was the Court's first articulation of the "trust relationship" which still exists
between the tribes and the federal government.2
The following year, in Worcester v. Georgia,22 the Court recognized tribes'
aboriginal sovereignty by holding that Indian tribes have a right of self-
government and are not subject to the jurisdiction of the states in which they are
located. The premise underlying the Court's recognition of the tribes' power was
that prior to European settlement on this continent, tribes possessed total
sovereignty.' Thus, each tribe began its relationship with the federal government
as a sovereign power whose acceptance of the stronger sovereign's protection did
not constitute a surrender of the tribe's independence and right of self-
government. 4 Between these two seminal cases, the Supreme Court enunciated
seemingly incompatible doctrines: tribes as dependent, tribes as sovereign.25
While tribes retained their aboriginal sovereignty, they remained subject to the
power of the federal government by virtue of their dependent status. As a
guardian, Congress could exercise plenary power over its ward-the tribes.
For more than a century, Congress recognized tribal sovereignty by negotiating
treaties with the tribes.26 With the passage of time, however, Congress began to
favor assimilationist goals, and it ceased the treaty-making practice?7 Congress
enacted legislation stating that "hereinafter no Indian nation or tribe within the
territory of the United States shall be acknowledged or recognized as an
independent nation, tribe, or power with whom the United States may contract
by treaty."' Following this policy vision, the Supreme Court soon determined in
United States v. Kagama29 that tribes would no longer be recognized as sovereign
nations. In the course of its opinion, the Court emphasized the guardian-ward
relationship between the federal government and the tribes, stating:
The power of the General Government over these remnants of a race once
powerful, now weak and diminished in numbers, is necessary to their
protection, as well as to the safety of those among whom they dwell. It must
exist in that government, because it never has existed anywhere else, because
the theatre of its exercise is within the geographical limits of the United
19. Id. at 17.
20. Christina D. Ferguson, Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo: A Modern Day Lesson on
Tribal Sovereignty, 46 ARK. L. REv. 275, 281 (1993).
21. Id.
22. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
23. Id. at 555, 560-61.
24. Judy D. Lynch, Note, Indian Sovereignty and Judicial Interpretations of the Indian
Civil Rights Act, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 897, 899.
25. Ferguson, supra note 20, at 282.
26. Id. at 283.
27. Id.
28. Act of Mar. 3, 1871, ch. 120, 16 Stat. 566, quoted in Lynch, supra note 24, at 900.
29. 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
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States, because it has never been denied, and because it alone can enforce its
laws on all the tribes.
30
The following year, Congress continued on its assimilationist bent by passing
the General Allotment Act, or Dawes Act,3' authorizing the division of tribally
held lands to individual Indians. 32 The apparent purpose of the Act was to
assimilate the Indians into contemporary American society by eliminating the
tribal land base and centralized tribal structure. 3
In the late 1920s and early 1930s, the federal policy towards Indian tribes
again shifted from assimilation to self-determination culminating in Congress's
passage of the Indian Reorganization Act ("IRA") of 1934. 34 The IRA
established procedures by which tribes could organize and govern their own
internal affairs. The procedures contained in the Act encouraged the tribes to
adopt constitutions that became effective once approved by both the tribe and the
Secretary of the Interior.3 s Most of the tribal constitutions called for the
establishment of a tribal court system in charge of internal dispute resolution.36
The IRA recognized tribal sovereignty as absolute, though still subject to the
limitations of express congressional legislation."
As one commentator noted, "[W]ith the adoption of the IRA, federal policy
had come full circle: from Worcester's recognition of tribal sovereignty to the
General Allotment Act's policy of assimilation by destroying tribal structure,
back to recognition-now by the IRA-of tribal autonomy. '38 To complicate
matters further, throughout the federal government's policy vacillations, the
status of tribal sovereignty has never been purely sovereign or dependent. While
tribes retain vestiges of aboriginal sovereignty, they still must submit to the
plenary power of Congress introduced by earlier cases. 39 The confused status of
tribes in the American system may currently be the most definitive characteristic
of federal Indian policy.
30. Id. at 384-85.
31. Act of Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (codified in scattered sections of 25 U.S.C.).
32. Lynch, supra note 24, at 900.
33.Id.
34. Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 576,48 Stat. 984 (codified as 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (1994)).
35. Lynch, supra note 24, at 900-01.
36. Fredric Brandfon, Comment, Tradition and Judicial Review in the American Indian
Tribal Court System, 38 UCLAL. REV. 991, 998 (1991).
37. Lynch, supra note 24, at 901.
38. Id.
39. The definition of Congress's plenary power over the tribes is most often attributed to
the case of United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886). See supra note 29 and
accompanying text.
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III. THE INDIAN CIVIL RIGHTS ACT
A. Enactment
Most of the limitations on federal and state governments aimed at protecting
individual civil rights were contained in the first fourteen amendments to the
United States Constitution.4" When U.S. citizenship was extended to the tribes
in 1924, they gained the protection against state and federal action owned by all
other Americans. 4 The question remained, however, whether the actions of the
tribal governments in relation to individual members were subject to the
restrictions of the federal Constitution.
This issue arose in 1896 in Talton v. Mayes.42 In Talton, the Supreme Court
faced the issue of whether or not the grand jury provision of the Fifth
Amendment applied to the criminal law of the Cherokee Nation. In a landmark
opinion, the Court held that the constitutional requirement was only applicable
to the federal government, stating that because the sovereign powers of Cherokee
governing bodies pre-dated the non-Indians' arrival on the continent, the Indian
courts were not federal agencies subject to the Fifth Amendment.43 In
acknowledging the tribe's aboriginal sovereignty, the Supreme Court clearly
reaffirmed its adherence to the principle of tribal self-determination, unless
Congress had expressly limited the tribe's power.44
Following Talton, federal courts used similar reasoning to hold that the other
federal constitutional amendments do not restrict tribal action. In Martinez v.
Southern Ute Tribe,4" for example, the federal court ruled that the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment did not apply to the acts of an Indian tribe in
denying an individual Indian the benefits of tribal membership. Similarly, in
Barta v. Oglala Sioux Tribe,46 the court ruled that neither the Due Process Clause
of the Fifth Amendment nor the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment applied to keep an Indian tribe from imposing a tax only on non-
members for the use of Indian trust lands.
Without the protection of the Federal Constitution to guard against civil rights
violations by Indian tribes, individual Indians lacked any protection against their
40. M. Allen Core, Tribal Sovereignty: Federal Court Review of Tribal Court
Decisions-Judicial Intrusion into Tribal Sovereignty, 13 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 175, 181 (1988).
41. Id.
42. 163 U.S. 376 (1896).
43. Donald L. Burnett, Jr., An Historical Analysis of the 1968 'Indian Civil Rights' Act, 9
HARV. J. ON LEGis. 557, 563 (1972). Burnett's article contains an in-depth historical
exploration of both the common law foundations for the ICRA and its legislative history.
44. Id.
45. 249 F.2d 915 (10th Cir. 1957). This case is discussed more fully in Lazarus, supra note
4, at 342.
46. 259 F.2d 553 (8th Cir. 1958). The Lazarus article also contains a deeper discussion of
this case. See Lazarus, supra note 4, at 342.
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governments, a proposition which alarmed some members of Congress.47 The
situation continued unchanged even through the height of the civil rights
movement sweeping the rest of America in the 1960s." The issue of tribal
limitations with regard to actions affecting tribal members was not addressed
until the passage of the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968."9
In response to alleged violations of civil rights by tribal governments, the
Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights began hearings in 1962 which
focused on individual rights against tribal governments. 0 "Charges included
election fraud, restrictions on religious freedom, harassment and illegal detention
of political activists, and arbitrary actions involving membership and property
rights."'" At the close of the hearings, the chief proponent of the reform
measures, Senator Hruska, stated:
As the hearings developed... I believe all of us who were students of the law
were jarred and shocked by the conditions as far as constitutional rights for
members of the Indian tribes were concerned. There was found to be
unchecked and unlimited authority over many facets of Indian rights.5 2
Early proposals to combat these atrocities, framed with an Anglo-American
conception of civil rights, included one that would have made tribes subject to
the identical constraints imposed upon the federal government by the U.S.
Constitution, and one providing for appeal from a tribal forum to a federal
district court, where the appeal would take the form of a trial de novo. s3
After seven years of proposals and counter-proposals, Congress finally settled
upon the final version of the ICRA.5 4 Title II of the Act extends a uniform "Bill
of Rights" to the tribes. Title II provides essentially that no tribe, in exercising
its powers of self-government, shall engage in activities which the federal and
state governments would be prohibited from undertaking pursuant to the Federal
Constitution."5 For the most part, the Indian Bill of Rights contained in the ICRA
mirrors its counterpart in the U.S. Constitution. Congress selectively extended
certain rights, however, in the final draft of Title II, declining to extend some
individual protections in deference to tribal cultural traditions.5 6 The Act differs
from the Bill of Rights in its omission of the First Amendment Establishment
Clause, in deference to the theocratic nature of some tribal governments, and in
47. See Burnett, supra note 43.
48. The American Indian exclusion from the legislative movement towards civil rights is
discussed in Core, supra note 40, at 182. Core also points out that Indians were excluded from
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Id.
49. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (1994).
50. Hardin, supra note 6, at 406.
51. Id.
52. 113 CONG. REc. 35473 (1967), quoted in Hardin, supra note 6, at 407.
53. Robert Berry, Civil Liberties Constraints on Tribal Sovereignty After the Indian Civil
Rights Act of 1968, 1 J.L. & POL'Y 1, 20 (1993). Berry points out the Senate's additional
concern that not only tribal governments were violating Indians' civil rights, but so were state
and federal agencies. Id.
54. The final version of the ICRA was codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (1994).
55. Lazarus, supra note 4, at 337.
56. See generally Burnett, supra note 43 (providing a more detailed discussion of the
differences between the Indian Bill of Rights and the Federal Bill of Rights).
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the limitations placed on a criminal defendant's right to counsel, in deference to
the unmanageable administrative and financial burden an absolute right to
counsel would place upon tribal court systems.
Despite the similarities in language between the ICRA and the Federal Bill of
Rights, the legislative history of the Act indicates that Congress did not intend
to subject tribal governments to the same restrictions as the federal and state
governments. 8 The legislative history and the text of the Act indicate
unambiguously that Congress intended to balance the application of individual
civil rights on reservations with continued tribal self-determination over internal
affairs. 9
While some tribes objected to the ICRA as an imposition of Anglo-American
values on Indian societies,6 ° Congress assumed that tribal courts have a duty to
enforce the Act.6 Regardless of any tribal objections, and without having to
obtain tribal consent, 2 Congress used its longstanding and legally recognized
plenary power over the tribes to determine the proper balance between individual
rights and tribal sovereignty, codify their determinations, and mandate their
application. 3
As one commentator has noted:
The tortured ambiguity regarding the constitutional and legal status of
Indians in the American regime is nowhere more evident than in the very
opening words of the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968. There, in laying out
the defining attributes of an Indian tribe, the Act says, on the one hand, that
these groups of Indians are "subject to the jurisdiction of the United States,"
and on the other, that they are "recognized as possessing powers of self-
government.""4
Unfortunately for Congress and the American courts, the passage of the ICRA
did not resolve all the ambiguities in terms of the powers and status of Indian
tribes, particularly on Indian Country. The ICRA left open the question of which
court system would be primarily responsible for hearing claims of civil rights
violations.
57. Lazarus, supra note 4, at 346-47.
58. See Burnett, supra note 43; Lynch, supra note 24, at 909-12.
59. Lazarus, supra note 4, at 347-48.
60. For a discussion of the tribal criticism of the ICRA, see Tim Vollmann, Criminal
Jurisdiction in Indian Country: Tribal Sovereignty and Defendants' Rights in Conflict, 22 U.
KAN. L. REV. 387 (1974); Alvin J. Ziontz, In Defense of Tribal Sovereignty: An Analysis of
Judicial Error in Construction of the Indian Civil Rights Act, 20 S.D. L. REv. 1 (1975).
61. Hardin, supra note 6, at 407.
62. "Indians also challenged the Act as an infringement of tribal sovereignty because it does
not allow for tribal consent to its application." Lynch, supra note 24, at 912.
63. See supra part II for a discussion of the origins of Congress's plenary power over the
tribes.
64. Jeffrey, supra note 6, at 358.
[Vol. 72:831
DUE PROCESS IN TRIBAL COURTS
B. Federal Application of the ICRA
For ten years following the application of the ICRA, individuals who felt that
a tribe had violated their civil rights could appeal tribal court determinations to
a federal district court.65 While the ICRA does not explicitly create a cause of
action justiciable in federal court, the courts generally determined that both
federal question and civil rights jurisdiction existed under the Act. 66 Given both
the legislative history and express language of the Act, Congress intended that
the Indian Bill of Rights contained in the ICRA be interpreted within the context
of tribal culture and traditions. While Congress had clearly intended to make the
ICRA guarantees similar to, but not coextensive with, the Federal Bill of Rights,
the federal courts had great difficulty balancing individual rights with traditional
tribal practices "where those practices were antithetical to the Anglo-American
concepts of personal freedom."6 Applying the balancing approach called for by
the Act, district and circuit courts arrived at inconsistent results.68
In Tom v. Sutton,69 the circuit court held that the terms "due process" and
"equal protection" in the ICRA should be construed by the court with sensitivity
towards the historical, cultural, and governmental values of Indian tribes. °
Accordingly, the interpretation of terms in the ICRA need not mirror the
interpretation of those terms in the federal system. Other cases, however, indicate
that situations may arise in which terms under the ICRA should be construed
identically to the federal application of those terms.' During the decade
following the passage of the ICRA, federal courts struggled to effectuate
Congress's dual policy objectives-individual rights and tribal sovereignty. The
Supreme Court, throughout this period, refused to resolve the issue, or even to
address it. Finally, in 1978, the Court decided the case of Santa Clara Pueblo v.
Martinez,72 drastically altering the application of Indian civil rights and striking
a major blow for tribal sovereignty.73
65. Core, supra note 40, at 175.
66. Ferguson, supra note 20, at 289. Ferguson further notes that the only requirement that
Indian plaintiffs did face in obtaining review under the Act was exhaustion of tribal remedies,
both administrative and judicial. Id.
67. Drew Michael Ryce, Enforcement of Indian Civil Rights, 37 RuTGERS L. REv. 1019,
1021 (1985).
68. Id.
69. 533 F.2d 1101 (9th Cir. 1976).
70. Id. at 1104 n.5; accord Groundhog v. Keeler, 442 F.2d 674 (10th Cir. 1971); cf Smith
v. Confederated Tribes, 783 F.2d 1409 (9th Cir. 1986) (noting that tribal courts may adopt
procedures different from federal courts to avoid intrusive interference by federal courts in
tribal administration of the law).
71. E.g., Daly v. United States, 483 F.2d 700 (8th Cir. 1973); White Eagle v. One Feather,
478 F.2d 1311 (8th Cir. 1973).
72. 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
73. Professor Robert Laurence has gone so far as to call Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez
"the single most interesting case in all of Anglo-American jurisprudence." Robert Laurence,
A Quincentennial Essay on Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo, 28 IDAHO L. REV. 307, 307 (1992).
While Professor Laurence ultimately disagrees with the Court's holding in Martinez, he notes
1997]
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IV. SANTA CLARA PUEBLO V. MARTINEZ
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez involved an ordinance of the Santa Clara
Pueblo Indian Tribe74 which denied tribal membership to children of a member
mother and non-member father. The plaintiff, Julia Martinez, was a member of
the Santa Clara Pueblo Tribe. After marrying a Navajo (non-Pueblo) Indian,
Martinez continued to live on her native reservation." Martinez sought to have
her children enrolled as members of the Santa Clara Pueblo.76 Because of the
inter-tribal marriage, tribal law denied membership to her children. If the mother
had been a Navajo and the father a member of the Pueblo, then the children could
have been enrolled." As a consequence of their exclusion from tribal
membership, the Martinez children could not vote in tribal elections nor run for
tribal office. Also, in the event of their mother's death, the children retained no
right of property inheritance, or even the right to remain on the reservation.78
After her attempt to obtain a tribal remedy failed, Martinez brought suit against
the tribe in federal district court under the equal protection clause of the ICRA79
seeking injunctive and declaratory relief for "ancestral" and sex discrimination."0
The federal court took jurisdiction, applied the ICRA's balancing test, and found
for the Pueblo.8' According to the court, the gender discriminating ordinance was
the modem embodiment of a tribal custom. As such, it was entitled to
deference. 2
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit again found that the jurisdiction requirements had
been satisfied, though the court reversed the case on the merits.83 Because the
that "[n]o case is better designed... to rouse an opinion, from lawyers and non-lawyers alike."
Id. at 308.
74. The 1939 ordinance reads in part:
1. All children born of marriages between members of the Santa Clara Pueblo
shall be members of the Santa Clara Pueblo.
2. [C]hildren born of marriages between male members of the Santa Clara Pueblo
and non-members shall be members of the Santa Clara Pueblo.
3. Children born of marriages between female members of the Santa Clara Pueblo
and non-members shall not be members of the Santa Clara Pueblo.
4. Persons shall not be naturalized as members of the Santa Clara Pueblo under
any circumstances.
Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 52 n.2.
75. Jeffrey, supra note 6, at 364.
76. The Santa Clara Pueblo has a patrilineal society, meaning that the children are members
of their fathers' Pueblo. Id.
77. Core, supra note 40, at 182. Core also points out that the custom was not changed by
the fact that the children were raised on the Pueblo and spoke the Pueblo language. Id. at 182-
83.
78. Jeffrey, supra note 6, at 364.
79. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(8) (1994).
80. Jeffrey, supra note 6, at 364.
81. Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo, 402 F. Supp. 5 (D.N.M. 1975).
82. Laurence, supra note 73, at 313-14.
83. Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo, 540 F.2d 1039 (10th Cir. 1976).
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court found that the ordinance was of modern and not traditional origin,
deference was not required. 4
When the case reached the U.S. Supreme Court, the Court reversed both lower
courts on jurisdictional grounds, never addressing the substantive merits of the
case. 5 In declining jurisdiction, the Court noted that federal court application of
the ICRA provisions would substantially interfere with the tribe's ability to
maintain itself as a distinct cultural and political entity.86 The Court stated, "[W]e
must bear in mind that providing a federal forum for issues arising under § 1302
constitutes an interference with tribal autonomy and self-government beyond that
created by the change in substantive law itself."87 The Court further reasoned that
while the ICRA certainly did intend to change the substantive law applied to the
civil rights of tribal members, tribal forums were available for the vindication of
these claims.8 The Court found that "Congress' failure to provide remedies other
than habeas corpus was a deliberate one."8 9 In the course of its decision, the
Court emphasized the "[t]wo distinct and competing purposes" in the ICRA:
"strengthening the position of individual tribal members vis-A-vis the tribe" and
the "commitment to the goal of tribal self-determination." ' Finally, the Court
recognized that Congress "modified the safeguards of the Bill of Rights to fit the
unique political, cultural, and economic needs of tribal governments." 9'
Effectively, the decision of the Court removed the federal courts from the field
of Indian civil rights.92
As a result of the Supreme Court's decision in Martinez, tribal courts were
elevated from the status of stepping stones en route to federal court to the sole
protectors of individual civil rights against the actions of tribal governments. 93
Without the general availability of federal court review of tribal court actions,
the Act must be interpreted on a tribe-by-tribe basis. Given the cultural and
traditional differences which exist between the tribes, one would expect that the
84. Laurence, supra note 73, at 314.
85. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 72 (1978).
86. Id. at 59.
87. Id In his article, Professor Jeffrey notes the strange consequences of Martinez. Jeffrey
states, "It may seem strange to say, but the Court in this decision denied the federal courts the
ability to enforce a federal statute ...... Jeffrey, supra note 6, at 355.
88. Martinez, 436 U.S. at 62-65.
89. Id at 61. Habeas corpus relief in federal court is authorized by the ICRA, 25 U.S.C. §
1303 (1994).
90. Martinez, 436 U.S. at 62.
91. Id. at 62-63.
92. Martinez, denying the federal court application of the ICRA, has been sharply criticized
by some commentators. See, e.g., Jeffrey, supra note 6 (claiming that Martinez stripped the
ICRA of any practical effect); Laurence, supra note 73 (advocating the federal court review of
ICRA claims); Ryce, supra note 67 (discussing the possibility that tribal courts lack the
autonomy from the tribal councils to effectively exercise the power ofjudicial review).
93. Williams, supra note 4, at 497. Professor Williams's thoughtful article presents the
ICRA as an example of one possible method of statutory interpretation in the field of Indian
law. Williams states, "As the tribes have rights to make laws for themselves, so should they
have rights to interpret the laws made for them." Id. at 496.
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meaning of the ICRA varies substantially across Indian Country. 4 The remaining
Parts will explore the tribal court's work in applying the ICRA, specifically the
due process guarantee.95
V. METHODOLOGY AND SAMPLING
As stated, the brunt of this Project focuses on the actual tribal court opinions
and their disposition of the due process clause of the ICRA. The Project was
undertaken with certain expectations in mind. Initially, given the enormous
variations between Indian tribal cultures, together with the Supreme Court's
stance on tribal courts as the sole arbiters of civil rights on Indian Country, one
might expect to be able to research this topic using conventional research'
techniques ingrained in law schools everywhere. One might expect to be able to
choose which tribes one wished to examine, go to the law library, pull their court
reporters off the shelves, flip through the index, find the heading "Indian Civil
Rights Act," find the subheading "Due Process," and then go to the appropriate
cases. If one approached the Project with these expectations, one would be
wrong.96
After these initial failures, finding a cogent alternative methodology proved
difficult. At the outset of the Project, four tribes were selected based on
geographic and cultural dissimilarity to be used as points of comparison in how
the tribes have applied the ICRA. Phone conversations with court representatives
from these tribes revealed that either these tribes do not publish or do not
disseminate their court opinions.97 After learning that several of the preliminary
choices of tribes did not make their opinions available,98 the search changed from
that which was optimal to that which was available. Thus, purely for reasons of
pragmatism, the choice was made to look only at tribes that both published their
tribal court opinions and distributed them.99 In this manner, the tribal court
94. Id. at 497.
95. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(8) (1994).
96. Anyone doubting the veracity of this warning is encouraged to try it with another
provision of the ICRA. Not only does the work need to be done, no one is doing it.
Forewarned, however, is forearmed.
97. The reasons given for this phenomenon ranged from inadequate resources to concern
for the integrity of tribal secrets.
98. A few tribes said they would make their opinions available but only within the court
office.
99. Admittedly, restricting this analysis only to tribes that publish and distribute their
opinions also restricts the Project's generalizability.
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opinions examined were taken from the Navajo Reporter,"° the Oklahoma Tribal
Court Reporter,'"' and the Indian Law Reporter. 2
While substantive conclusions ultimately will be drawn regarding the tribal
applications of the ICRA's due process clause,0 3 perhaps the most striking and
important point learned in doing this research is the relative scarcity of cases that
touch upon the ICRA at all. Of the three sources, and almost two thousand cases
reviewed, less than one hundred even mentioned the ICRA. For purposes of this
analysis, only the cases addressing the due process provision of the ICRA were
reviewed further, for several reasons.' First, other provisions contained in Title
II of the ICRA simply do not arise with enough frequency (or are not reported
with enough frequency) to provide adequate grounds for conclusions to be
drawn. Due process claims arose in tribal courts, usually concurrently with other
claims, with enough frequency to allow lessons to be learned." 5 Second, and
conceptually more importantly, the due process clause was chosen by virtue of
its paradigmatic status in the Anglo-American liberal-democratic system.0 6 One
focus was to explore how the tribes, which may or may not be organized in
liberal-democratic ways like the American system, apply one of the liberal-
democratic maxims: fundamental fairness in the form of due process. The next
section will briefly outline the application and meaning of due process in the
100. In 1968, the Navajo Nation began publishing many of the tribe's important cases from
its courts. Currently, the Navajo Reporter consists of five volumes comprising the years 1968-
87 inclusive. Volume 6 has yet to be distributed, though certain important Navajo cases for the
years after 1987 have been reported elsewhere. See infra note 102 for a discussion of the Indian
Law Reporter. The Navajo Reporter is arranged essentially the same as a state reporter, and it
contains no index. Thus, every case must be reviewed when looking for a particular subject.
101. The Oklahoma Tribal Court Reporter, published by the University of Oklahoma City,
consists of three volumes of tribal court opinions from tribes located specifically in the State
of Oklahoma. The Oklahoma Tribal Court Reporter, which does contain a subject index, has
been previously edited so that it contains only cases deemed by the reporter's editors as
sufficiently important or illustrative.
102. The Indian Law Reporter, a publication of the American Indian Lawyer Training
Program, began publishing various tribal court opinions in January, 1983. The Indian Law
Reporter accepts opinions submitted by tribes all across the United States and publishes
opinions which "reflect both a geographic diversity and a sampling of relevant issues." 10
Indian L. Rptr. 6001 (1983). Not every decision received by the Indian Law Reporter is
published, so again, some previous editing has taken place.
103. See infra part VIII.
104. Cases that merely mentioned the due process clause in passing were also not included
in this analysis, as they said nothing of import for the purpose of this Project.
105. In a telephone conversation with Judge Alvin Settler of the Tribal Court (Adult Court)
of the Yakima Nation, the question was posed, "Has the Yakima Tribal Court ever addressed
any of the provisions in the ICRA's Bill of Rights?" to which Judge Settler responded, "No.
It's just that nobody ever raises a stink about it. Sure, we try and follow [the ICRA], but these
things just don't come up. I think there are some due process cases which have come up, but
I'm not aware of any decisions on the others." Telephone Interview with Judge Alvin Settler,
Tribal Court of the Yakima Nation (Nov. 1, 1995).
106. J. Freitag, Translating Nisi Per Legem Terrae: The Semiotics of Due Process 47 (1995)
(unpublished LL.M. Thesis, Northwestern University).
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American system so as to provide a frame of reference against which the tribal
applications may be compared.
VI. DUE PROCESS IN THE ANGLO-AMERICAN TRADITION
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution
contain a due process guarantee that neither life, liberty, nor property can be
denied to any person without due process of law. Due process provides a
guarantee against governmental action not covered by law. In other words, no
government official may take any action-without being authorized by law to do
so. Additionally, "due process of law" means that any law which might
potentially deprive one of life, liberty, or property must contain certain basic
procedures; a person shall be accorded a certain "process" if the government
seeks to deprive her of life, liberty, or property.0 7 When the power of a
government is to be used, or has already been used, against an individual, that
individual has a right to a fair procedure to determine the basis for, and legality
of, such action.'
The concept of due process has also evolved into a substantive constraint on
the enactment of legislation. Substantive due process is the concept that
government may not enact a particular law because that law is inherently unfair
and unjust and, as such, can never meet the requirement of due process. Again,
this requirement seems amenable to the moniker, "fundamental fairness." The
substance of the law must be just and must not unfairly deprive people of their
life, liberty, or property. While originally confined to procedural protections, due
process in Anglo-American jurisprudence has evolved into substantive
constraints as well.
If an individual's life, liberty, or property is at stake, the individual is ensured
that he will be given a fair procedure. The question thus focuses on the nature
and quantity of the process that is due.0 9 Although de process has never been
precisely defined, the thrust is generally away from arbitrariness in governmental
actions. The exact process which is due prior to a deprivation of individual rights
varies depending on the type of deprivation involved. Essentially, the paramount
guarantee of the due process clause is that of fairness. The procedure must be
fundamentally fair to the individual in the resolution of the factual and legal
basis for the governmental actions which have deprived him of his life, liberty,
or property interest."0 Beyond the differences which situations may warrant, a
general requirement exists that the procedures be fair and impartial."'




110. Id. at 551.
I11. Professors Nowak and Rotunda further list some of the elements which judges will
consider in determining whether due process has been served:
The essential elements are: (1) adequate notice of the charges or basis for the
government action; (2) a neutral decision-maker; (3) an opportunity to make an
oral presentation to the decision-maker, (4) an opportunity to present evidence or
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In addition to other requirements, due process requires that the government
give notice to of government action that would deprive them of a constitutionally
protected life, liberty, or property interest."2 Again, while the precise
requirements vary, the notice provided must be "reasonably designed to insure
that the interested parties in fact will learn of the proposed adjudicative
action."".3
Synthesizing the broad range of definitions that comprise due process in
different settings, due process in the American system requires fundamental
fairness. The remainder of this Project will examine different tribal court
conceptions of due process, compare those conceptions with Anglo-American
conceptions, and attempt to draw conclusions based on these findings.
VII. TRIBAL COURT APPLICATIONS OF DUE PROCESS
As stated, given the enormous variation between tribal cultures, one would
expect these variations to be reflected in the tribal courts' disposition of due
process. Martinez authorizes tribal courts to assume control of civil rights
actions, while denying the federal courts the power of review. The questions thus
remain: What does the concept of due process mean to tribal courts? How have
tribal courts applied the due process clause of the ICRA? Is it possible for tribal
courts to apply due process with cultural values in mind when the concept of due
process, and even the concept of individual civil rights generally, may not be part
of their cultural tradition at all? Since tribes are required to apply the ICRA, how
can those tribes that have no conception of due process apply it? In an attempt
to shed light on these questions, the Project now turns to the actual tribal court
opinions. 1 4 For purposes of clarity, the cases will be addressed on a tribe-by-
witnesses to the decision-maker; (5) a chance to confront and cross-examine
witnesses or evidence to be used against the individual; (6) the right to have an
attorney present the individual's case before the decision-maker; (7) a decision
based on the record with a statement of reasons for the decision.
Id. at 548.
112. Id. at 552-53.
113. Id at 553.
114. A short note on citation practices seems appropriate before any case analysis begins.
The Bluebook contains precious little insight into Indian law case citation, mentioning only
cases published in the Navajo Reporter, other tribes have been neglected. The authorities in this
Note therefore come without authoritative guidance on their citation. For the sake of clarity and
completeness, and staying true to the spirit of the Bluebook, the following practices have been
adopted: (1) Nay. R. has become Navajo Rptr.; (2) ILR has become Indian L. Rptr., using
Bluebook abbreviations; (3) Okla. Trib. has become Okla. Tribal Ct. Rptr. using its full name
and Bluebook abbreviations. Additionally, wherever possible, the tribal court has been noted
with as much specificity as possible, using Bluebook abbreviations. The Navajo Court of
Appeals is referred to as Navajo Ct. App., although the Bluebook does not require this. A tribe
name without a court refers to the Supreme Court of that tribe.
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tribe basis. Because its courts have addressed the issue more than any other tribe
of record,"' the Navajos lead off the analysis.
A. The Navajo Nation
The Navajo Nation is distinctive, though not unique, in the fact that it operates
without a written constitution. It does, however, have a written Bill of Rights
contained within the Navajo Tribal Code-its written set of laws. Beyond the due
process guarantees contained within the Navajo Bill of Rights and the ICRA Bill
of Rights, Navajo courts repeatedly emphasize that the concept of due process
existed in their cultural tradition before either Bill of Rights, and would continue
to exist without them. In keeping with United States courts, due process to
Navajo courts amounts to fundamental fairness, specifically notice and
opportunity to be heard.
Wilson v. Wilson"6 illustrates the Navajo courts' willingness to accept the
notion of fundamental fairness as definitive of due process rights. In this divorce
action, a default judgment was entered against the husband by the tribal district
court for having filed his answer to the complaint one day late. Mr. Wilson then
filed a motion with the district court to set aside the default judgment, the main
reason being that his answer was filed only one day late. The district court denied
his motion. On appeal, the tribal court of appeals stated:
The argument was made that somehow the failure of the [district] court to
grant the motion to set aside the judgment was a denial of "fundamental
fairness" and "the right to be heard" under the Indian Civil Rights Act. Those
arguments are utterly without merit. "Fundamental fairness" does not
preclude society and the courts from fixing reasonable rules to make certain
cases are handled smoothly and efficiently .... It is fundamentally fair to
require that a person who does not follow the rules and asks to be excused
from following them be required to give the court good reasons why they
were not followed.'" 7
Although the court denied that Mr. Wilson's due process rights had been
abridged, it did acknowledge that due process requires that fundamental fairness
be afforded.
Yazzie v. Jumbo"' further refines the Navajo conception of due process. To
define due process conceptually, the Navajo Supreme Court looks directly to
cases decided by the U.S. Supreme Court. The case involved a dispute over water
rights between two groups. After losing at trial, one side appealed, claiming that
it was deprived of its ICRA-guaranteed due process rights because it was not
properly served with the appellee's complaint prior to the board meeting at which
the dispute was initially resolved. In addressing this due process claim, the court
115. The relative frequency may be due to the fact that the Navajo Nation is by far the largest
tribe in the United States, accounting for more than half of the total Indian reservation
population. The Navajo court system, and tribal courts generally, are discussed in more detail
in the study by BRAKEL, supra note 2.
116. 3 Navajo Rptr. 145 (Navajo Ct. App. 1982).
117. Id. at 147.
118. 5 Navajo Rptr. 75 (Navajo 1986).
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first attempted to define the scope of appellants' due process rights. Citing only
U.S. Supreme Court cases, the court stated:
Procedural due process relates to the requisite characteristics of proceedings
which seek to effect a deprivation of life, liberty, or property. Procedural due
process requires adherence to the fundamental principles of justice and fair
play. It encompasses the requirements of notice, and opportunity to be heard,
and to defend before a tribunal with jurisdiction to hear the case. It
necessarily follows that due process is not required where there is no
interference with life, liberty, or a vested property right."9
The Navajo Supreme Court in this case conceptualized due process as
fundamental fairness in the same way as the federal courts. 20 Because it found
no property interest implicated in the case, the court denied relief on the due
process claim. The following two cases provide the clearest explication of the
meaning of due process for Navajo courts.
In Begay v. Navajo Nation,'2' the Navajo Supreme Court addressed an appeal
of the lower court's order of forfeiture on appellant's automobile as a result of
a conviction on the charge of "Delivery of Liquor."'" The supreme court held
that the district court denied appellant due process by granting the motion for
forfeiture without giving him notice that such a motion had ever been filed
against him. While the court was careful to limit its holding to the immediate
case, 2 1 it proceeded to explain the role of due process in Navajo society,
including the origins of the concept. The court first acknowledged the fact that
compliance with due process generally was mandated by both Navajo and federal
law: "Navajo court proceedings must comply with the Navajo Bill of Rights and
the Indian Civil Rights Act, and as such, we must insure compliance with ... due
process before someone is deprived of their private property."' 24 According to the
court, due process requires at least notice and opportunity to be heard before
property deprivation occurs.25
Later in the opinion, the supreme court emphasized that the notion of due
process has deeply-embedded roots in the Navajo society; due process is, in fact,
a tradition in Navajo tribal culture:
The concept of due process was not brought to the Navajo Nation by the
Indian Civil Rights Act or the Navajo Bill of Rights. The Navajo people have
an established custom of notifying all involved parties in a controversy and
allowing them, and even other interested parties, an opportunity to present
119. Id. at 76 (citations omitted).
120. Because so few cases address specifically what due process entails, the focus here is on
tribal due process at the conceptual level. In other words, the focus here is on the general
contours of the due process guarantee, as opposed to the specific requisite procedures a tribe
must afford.
121. 15 Indian L. Rptr. 6032 (Navajo 1988).
122. Id. at 6033.
123. "We hold only that the forfeiture of an automobile demands notice and a hearing." Id.
at 6034.
124. Id. (citations omitted).
125. Id.
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and defend their positions. This custom is still followed by the Navajo people
in the resolution of disputes.'26
The court then outlined the procedures involved in traditional Navajo due
process:
When conflicts arise, involved parties will go to an elder statesman, a
medicine man, or a well-respected member of the community for advice on
the problem and to ask that person to speak with the one they see as the cause
of the conflict. The advisor will warn the accused of the action being
contemplated and give notice of the upcoming group gathering. At the
gathering, all parties directly or indirectly involved will be allowed to speak,
after which a collective decision will be made. This is Navajo customary due
process and it is carried out with fairness and respect. The heart of Navajo
due process, thus, is notice and opportunity to present and defend a
position.27
In its holding, the court stated that the district court did violate the defendant's
due process rights "by granting the 'Motion for Forfeiture' without notice [to
appellant] or without allowing him an opportunity to be heard."'' 28
In a case decided later that same year, the Navajo Supreme Court further
elucidated its due process interpretation in Billie v. Abbott. 129 The suit arose
when Abbott, a Utah official, intercepted the federal tax returns of Navajos
living on the Navajo Reservation whose children received federal benefits. The
plaintiffs, of whom Billie was one, 3 ' claimed that their rights were violated when
Abbott caused the tax interceptions and when he used state law to decide the
plaintiffs' child support obligations. A default judgment was entered against
Abbott in tribal court for his failure to comply with discovery orders. Among his
claims on appeal, Abbott raised the issue of whether the Navajo District Court
could exercise personal jurisdiction over him in this matter.
In the course of finding that the Navajo court did have.personal jurisdiction
over Abbott, the supreme court commented on the meaning of culture and
tradition in determining whether due process has been provided. According to the
court:
Due process under the ICRA and the [Navajo Bill of Rights] must be
interpreted in a way that will enhance Navajo culture and tradition. Navajo
domestic relations, such as divorce or child support, is an area where Navajo
traditions are the strongest. To enhance the Navajo culture the Navajo courts
must synthesize the principles of Navajo government and custom law. From
this synthesis Navajo due process is formed.
When Navajo sovereignty and cultural autonomy are at stake, the Navajo
courts must have broad-based discretion in interpreting the due process
clauses of the ICRA and [Navajo Bill of Rights], and the courts may apply
126. Begay v. Navajo Nation, 15 Indian L. Rptr. 6032, 6034 (Navajo 1988) (citations
omitted).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 6033.
129. 16 Indian L. Rptr. 6021 (Navajo 1988).
130. Billie was the named plaintiff in a class action.
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Navajo due process in a way that protects civil liberties while preserving
Navajo culture and self-government.' 3'
The court found that because Abbott interfered in an area of Navajo culture
with strong cultural ties-domestic relations-personal jurisdiction could be
exercised over him without offending his due process rights.
Perhaps the most concise statement of Navajo conceptions of due process can
be found in an action based on an attempt to quiet title to an inheritance of real
property. In re Estate of Goldtooth Begay #2132 involved a dispute over the
ownership of a land use permit and a grazing permit, both formerly held by the
deceased. The appellant, administrator of Begay's estate, contended that the
lower court should have awarded the permits to Begay's heirs. She argued that
her due process rights were violated because she was denied an opportunity to
participate in the action to quiet title. In the course of holding that her due
process rights had not been violated, the court summarized the tribe's stance on
due process rights:
Although due process of law is expressly guaranteed by the Navajo Nation
Bill of Rights, this court has noted that "[t]he concept of due process was not
brought to the Navajo Nation by the Indian Civil Rights Act [nor] the Navajo
Bill of Rights." Instead, due process is "fundamental fairness in a Navajo
cultural context," and "strict standards of fairness and equity... are inherent
in the Navajo common law." Due process is found by synthesizing the
principles of Navajo custom and government, and it is applied "with fairness
and respect."' 33
The court then outlined in more detail what due process requires:
This court has held that Navajo due process ensures notice and an
opportunity to be heard for all parties to a dispute, entitles parties to
representation, protects the right to seek political office, prevents the
enforcement of ambiguous statutes affecting personal and property rights,
must be provided when the government takes private property without the
owner's consent, and applies to juvenile proceedings to the same extent as to
adult proceedings.'34
From the court's language, one can see that Navajo culture places strong
emphasis on due process as fundamental fairness in a manner similar to Anglo-
American culture. While the tribal courts of the Navajos may finally apply the
abstract principle of due process in ways similar to Anglo-American culture, they
stress repeatedly that this is not because of the injection of civil rights into tribal
culture by the federal government and the ICRA. Notions of fundamental
fairness exist as part of Navajo traditional culture, particularly notice and
opportunity to be heard. Since, however, the source of the right to fairness is not
the ICRA, the tribe recognizes and preserves its right to differ from an Anglo-
American conception of due process if their cultural traditions call for it. In this
sense, the vision of Martinez-tribal application of the ICRA so as to respect
13 1. Id. at 6024.
132. 19 Indian L. Rptr. 6130 (Navajo 1992).
133. Id at 6131 (citations omitted).
134. Id. at 6131-32 (citations omitted).
1997]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
tribal values-seems to have been successful, at least at the conceptual level, in
the Navajo context.
B. The Colville Confederated Tribes'35
While the Colville Confederated Tribes do not publish their opinions, several
cases decided by their tribal courts were included in the Indian Law Reporter.
Similar to the Navajo application of the due process clause, the Colville
Confederated Tribes recognize the protection of tribal members' civil rights in
the form of the Colville Tribal Civil Rights Act ("CTCRA"). '36 According to the
Colville Confederated Tribes Court of Appeals in Colville Confederated Tribes
v. St. Peter, '37 tribal courts' attention should first be aimed at compliance with
the tribal ordinances.
In St. Peter, the appellant alleged that the trial court erred by imposing
excessive sentences which were arbitrary and capricious and constituted cruel
and unusual punishment, and which violated his due process rights guaranteed
by the tribal code by relying on allegedly inaccurate information in sentencing
the defendant. 3 According to the court, the Tribal Code mandates compliance
with the tribal constitution, tribal statutory and common law, and the ICRA, in
that order.'
In examining judicial principles on sentencing guidelines, the tribal court looks
to federal court applications. While the tribal court is not required to comply with
federal standards on the issue of sentencing guidelines, it does believe that
federal principles may be used in an advisory capacity. The court states:
The federal law principles for sentencing review are not "specifically
applicable to Indian tribal courts." They are based upon the federal
constitutional standards, and not upon the tribal constitution or the Indian
Civil Rights Act. Therefore, we consider such principles to be advisory
only.140
Later in the opinion, the tribal court further reserves the right to use federal
interpretations of the concept of due process to. guide its own applications. The
court, however, stresses the tribe's ability to vary from the federal interpretations
at its discretion. The court finds this ability in the Congressional purpose behind
the ICRA:
[T]he legislative history of the ICRA clearly indicates that Congress did not
intend to impose full constitutional guarantees under the Bill of Rights on
litigants coming before the tribal court or to restrict the tribes beyond what
135. The Colville Reservation is located in the north-central portion of the State of
Washington.
136. Colville Tribal Civil Rights Act, Title 56.01, cited in Colville Confederated Tribes v.
St. Peter, 20 Indian L. Rptr. 6108 (Colville Ct. App. 1993).
137. 20 Indian L. Rptr. 6108 (Colville Ct. App. 1993).
138. The Tribal Code reads, in pertinent part, "All accused persons shall be guaranteed all
civil rights secured under the Tribal Constitution and federal laws specifically applicable to
Indian tribal courts." Id. at 6109.
139. Id.
140. Id. (citations omitted).
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was necessary to give the Act the effect Congress intended. Among the goals
intended by Congress in enacting [sic] ICRA were affording constitutional
protections to litigants on one hand, and supporting tribal self-government
and cultural autonomy on the other. We therefore apply due process
principles under [sic] ICRA with flexibility and in a manner contextually
adapted by the Colville Confederated Tribes.'
4
'
The tribe may use the federal courts as indicators, but considers such practices
purely discretionary.
Appellant argued that federal cases supported his contention that criminal
defendants have a right to be sentenced on the basis of accurate information.'4 2
After discussing the federal cases, the tribal court pronounced that the federal
interpretations properly reflected notions of fundamental fairness consistent with
tribal law. 143 Again, however, the court stressed the autonomy of tribal courts:
[W]e emphasize that the due process principles reflected in the [federal] cases
cited above are federal constitutional standards which cannot be applied
without great difficulty to tribal law. Further, the question before us is
whether the appellant's due process rights under tribal law were contravened.
We believe that such a finding must precede any determination that the
appellant's rights were violated under the Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C.
§ 1302(8). Therefore, we adopt a flexible standard of review, utilizing the
above [federal] principles, to determine whether the appellant was afforded
due process under tribal law.
144
Finally, and most emphatically, the court comments:
Even if the court should follow the Federal Rules of Evidence or the business
council should adopt specific court rules which parallel the federal criminal
rules, this does not mean that the tribal culture, tradition and autonomy has
been abandoned. Nor does it mean that the tribal court has taken on such an
Anglo-Saxon character that the Bill of Rights should be applied.'
45
The tribal court reserves the right to look to federal courts for guidance in
interpreting a given concept, such as due process, and does not view this practice
as destructive of tribal autonomy. The tribal court still applies the due process
clause with sensitivity towards tribal culture and tradition. Federal law will only
be given credence when it does not conflict with the cultural traditions of the
tribe. Other opinions by the Colville tribal courts are not so candid about the
relationship between tribal court autonomy and federal decisions, but they do
reenforce the Colville Confederated Tribes' belief in due process as fundamental
fairness, specifically requiring notice and the opportunity to be heard.
In Swan v. CBC,146 the petitioner brought an action against the Colville
Business Council ("CBC") asking the court to enjoin the Council from validating
the results of one district's election in order to allow the petitioner to show that
a new election should take place. Swan alleged that the election committee did
not handle his grievance correctly, though he was afforded a hearing on his
141. Id. at 6110 (citations omitted).
142. Id. at 6111.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 6113-14.
145. Id. at 6115.
146. 19 Indian L. Rptr. 6113 (Colville Tribal Ct. 1992).
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complaints. In ruling on his action, the court acknowledged that an individual's
civil rights guarantee him the right to notice and an opportunity to be heard.
Again, however, the court addressed the petitioner's civil rights as guaranteed
him under the Colville Tribal Code, 4 7 given by the tribe, and not the ICRA,
given by the federal government. The court stated:
The petitioner was afforded the right to grieve, and the fact that he disagreed
with the manner in which the grievance was handled does not detract from the
fact that he did receive his grievance hearing....
Due process is "that process which is due": notice and opportunity to be
heard. Once again, just because one disagrees with the decision does not
mean due process was not provided. 4
Although the court recognizes the petitioner's right to due process, the source
of these rights is tribal law, independent of federal mandates by way of the
ICRA. By the language of the court, if the Colville Confederated Tribes wished
to differ markedly in their application of due process rights from the federal
government, it could and would.
In Colville Confederated Tribes v. Wiley, '49 the Colville Tribal Court of
Appeals held that a provision of tribal law incorporating Washington state law
was a valid exercise of tribal legislative authority, provided that sufficient notice
was given to tribal members regarding the adoption of the state's provisions. The
appellants argued that the incorporation of state law on driving under the
influence of intoxicating alcohol or drugs did not provide adequate notice of
prohibited criminal conduct, thus infringing upon their right to due process under
the CTCRA and the ICRA. In deciding that adequate notice had not been
provided, the tribal court looked to the common federal court standard
concerning the incorporation of laws from other jurisdictions. The court stated:
The appellants [sic] challenge to [the tribal code] as providing inadequate
notice of what conduct is prohibited under tribal law has been addressed and
rejected by the federal courts .... It has consistently been held that a
continuing incorporation of law from another jurisdiction provides sufficient
notice for due process purposes under federal constitutional standards.
Although the appellants are guaranteed statutory due process under the ICRA
and CTCRA, no argument has been advanced that they are entitled to greater
notice than under federal constitutional standards.15 0
Without explanation, the tribal court assumes the federal standard as the baseline
for notice requirements under incorporated statutes. According to the court,
because federal courts have held that incorporated statutes do provide sufficient
notice, the equivalent standard should be applied-by tribal courts. In this case, the
court again looks to the federal law for guidance, but unlike other cases, does not
mention its ability to part from the federal interpretation. Comparing the words
of the Colville Confederated Tribal Courts to Navajo Tribal Courts, one finds a
147. The Colville Tribal Code grants a right to redress grievances in section 56.02(a). Swan,
19 Indian L. Rptr. at 6114.
148. Swan, 19 Indian L. Rptr. at 6114 (citation omitted).
149. 22 Indian L. Rptr. 6059 (Colville Ct. App. 1995).
150. Id. at 6064.
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general similarity. Both tribes seem cognizant of their ability to differ, while both
seem willing to look to federal courts for guidance on the "correct" way to apply
due process.
C. The Hoopa Valley Tribe'
The courts of the Hoopa Valley Tribe have been relatively lucid with regard
to their interpretation of due process guarantees. Similar to other tribes
examined, the Hoopas recognize the necessity of using the federal courts as
guides to tribal interpretation, while they remain protective of their rights to
differ. The Hoopa Valley courts, however, seem more inclined to bemoan the
impositional character of the ICRA.
In United States v. McGahuey, ' a tribal appellate court case, the appellant
McGahuey challenged the tribal court's refusal to grant a jury trial for alleged
fishing violations as a denial of his due process rights guaranteed by the ICRA.
To answer the question of whether the appellant's rights had been violated, the
court looked to the purpose underlying the ICRA, stating:
[T]he Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, both in intent as demonstrated by a
reading of the legislative history of the Act and by the specific language of
the Act, was designed to promote the imposition in part of the existing
dominant culture's notions of equal protection and due process as they apply
to the "criminal process." Without commenting on either the "acceptability"
or the "desirability" of such an approach, those factors, plus a reading of the.
cases interpreting the Act make Congress' intent and accomplishments clear.
The Act insures that those appearing in the Indian courts of the various tribes
will be assured certain "fundamental rights." Because this court system and
this issue is governed by the Indian Civil Rights Act, which purposely
encompasses many concepts defined by years of practice and precedence, we
are forced to look to the dominant system for interpretation of this right to
jury concept.'
This court points out that the ICRA, a federal statute, can only be interpreted
with federal standards as guides. The court is saying that to enforce Anglo-
American concepts, it must look to federal courts for guidance as to what certain
terms mean in practice. Applying federal standards and conceptions of
fundamental rights in the arena of jury trials when there is a threat of a jail
sentence, the appellate court upheld the trial court's denial of appellant's claim
to a jury trial.
Beyond mere judicial discretion to look to federal decisions for guidance, the
Hoopa Valley Tribe actually codified the practice of looking at other
jurisdictions, though it specifically rejected the often hostile state law. In the
case of United States v. Jones,"5 the Hoopa Valley appellate court addressed the
issue of when and for what reasons tribal judges may dismiss matters coming
before them. The appellant argued in this case that the trial court's dismissal of
his action was procedural error. Appellant argued that the tribal judges should
151. The Hoopa Valley Reservation is located in Northern California.
152. 10 Indian L. Rptr. 6051 (Hoopa Ct. Ind. Off. 1983).
153. Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
154. 11 Indian L. Rptr. 6010 (Hoopa Ct. App. 1984).
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be bound by federal procedural law, specifically Rule 48 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure which governs dismissals. In the course of its opinion, the
appellate court discussed the Hoopa Valley Tribe's practice of looking to the
federal system for guidance:
It cannot be denied that the "federal system" has had vast experience with
criminal procedure and this court has previously noted their desire to look to
federal rules for guidance. Indeed in the Rules of Court for the Hoopa Valley
Indian Reservation Court of Indian Offenses, Rule 5, Proper Judicial
Precedent, this court has indicated their interest in looking to the federal
system for guidance. Rule 5 reads as follows[:]
(a) The Court shall give greatest weight to relevant prior appellate decisions
of the Hoopa Valley Court of Indian Offenses, then to other tribal court
decisions (written), then to federal decisions, then to decisions of the trial
court. State law does not apply.'
The Hoopa Valley Tribe not only recognizes its judges' ability to use federal
common law as guidance, but expressly authorizes them to do so. The tribal court
does, however, note that tribal courts may depart from federal law in applying
due process, as Martinez authorizes them to do. The opinion reads:
This court's primary responsibility is to insure that principles of fairness
prevail in the action of the Court of Indian Offenses, and in so doing this
court does not concede that federal law is the sole definition of procedural
fairness. Specifically, this court finds that in the Court of Indian Offenses
judges may, at their discretion, dismiss matters in the interest ofjustice.15 6
According to the court, tribal judges are empowered with more discretion than
federal judges. Greater discretionary power is consistent with the characteristic
of tribal courts as relatively informal decisionmaking bodies. As one
commentator noted, "the trial courtroom is markedly informal and relaxed as
compared to that of the Anglo-American system."'5 7 With their discretionary
power, the court in Jones found that the trial court judge had abused his
discretion and dismissal was not sufficiently justified.
The Hoopa Valley tribal courts have echoed these sentiments-the ability to
use the federal courts as guides and their power to remain relatively informal
institutions-in later cases. In Hoopa Valley Indian Housing Authority v.
Gerstner,"5 8 the Hoopa Valley Court of Appeals upheld the Tribal Employment
Rights Ordinance Commission's reinstatement decision in an action for wrongful
termination of employment. The appellant claimed that the tribe's employment
termination procedures were inadequate, thus depriving her of her due process
rights. The primary issue before the court was whether due process rights must
accompany termination from tribal employment. After acknowledging that the
ICRA guarantees that individuals will not be deprived of property without due
155. Id.
156. Id. (emphasis added).
157. VINE DELORIA, JR. & CLIFFORD M. LYTLE, AMERICAN INDIANS, AMERICAN JusTIcE
118-19 (1983).
158. 22 Indian L. Rptr. 6002 (Hoopa Ct. App. 1993).
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process of law, the court then looked to the federal court standard in resolving
this question. The court stated:
The United States Supreme Court in construing federal constitutional rights,
has held that due process applies to discharge from public employment.
Even though the decisions of federal, state, and other tribal courts are not
controlling in this court, such decisions can be used as guidance in helping
us address these issues." 9
The court then, uncharacteristically, listed those rights which are guaranteed by
due process in the specific case context, but only after noting that due process
rights need not be synonymous with formal adjudicative processes. According
to the court:
Although we decide that due process rights must be granted to employees,
including the right to a hearing before an impartial arbiter, that does not
necessarily mean that formal trial and court procedures should apply.
However, there are certain minimal rights of employees that should be
protected in order to have a meaningful opportunity to be heard. Those rights
include: (1) adequate notice, (2) a hearing decision by [sic] independent
arbiter, (3) an initial burden of proof imposed on the employer, and (4) the
right to confront and cross-examine those witnesses used against the
employee. 60
While adopting processes and procedures that provide fundamental fairness in
ways similar to federal standards, the Hoopa courts, like other tribal courts
examined, acknowledge and preserve their right to differ from Anglo-American
values. A final Hoopa case provides an example of the tribal court knowingly
departing from federal standards.
Baldy, Sr. v. Hoopa Valley Tribal Council'6' concerned the issue of adequate
notice in the context of a tribal enrollment. Lola McCovey applied to the
enrollment committee for enrollment based upon the tribal lineage of her father,
Clarence Baldy. Tribal enrollment would have affected her rights of inheritance.
Paternity questions existed because Baldy had died several years earlier and was
not listed on McCovey's birth certificate as her father. 6 On two separate
occasions, notice of the enrollment and subsequent hearing was published in the
only daily newspaper of general circulation in the tribal community. At the
enrollment hearing, the Tribal Council approved McCovey's enrollment
application.
Some time later, the appellant filed suit challenging the Tribal Council's
decision to enroll McCovey on the basis that they did not have adequate notice
of the hearing that determined paternity for enrollment purposes. The appellant
argued, unsuccessfully, that the federal notice standard in determining heirs of
allottees or heirs of deceased allottees should be adopted and applied by the
tribal court. Articulating the federal standard, the court noted:
159. Id. at 6005 (citation omitted).
160. Id.
161. 22 Indian L. Rptr. 6015 (Hoopa Ct. App. 1994).
162. The details of the tribe's patrilineal customs are not relevant to the analysis here.
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However, if the court was to rely on federal notice standards, appropriate
notice is that which is "reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances to
apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an
opportunity to present their objections . . . but with due regard for the
practicalities and peculiarities of the case . 163
Rejecting the federal standard in affirming the trial court, the appellate court
explained:
The trial court acknowledged that while the federal standard of notice could
possibly be adopted, it had not yet been adopted at Hoopa. The customary
notice by publication and posting, when there are unknown interested parties,
was the accepted practice of the trial court at the time of the hearing. The trial
court declined to adopt the federal notice requirement and retroactively apply
the standard. The court of appeals agrees.'
The tribal courts of the Hoopa Valley Reservation reserve the right to differ from
federal application of due process composite rights such as notice, as illustrated
by the exercise of power in Baldy.
D. Oklahoma Tribes'65
In the case of Election Board v. Snake,'66 decided by the Court of Indian
Appeals for the Ponca Tribe, the appellant Election Board, sought review of a
tribal court decision stating that the Election Board's refusal to allow appellees
to run in the tribal election violated their due process rights. The appellees
complained that the Election Board set a deadline for filing candidacies and
subsequently extended the deadline, but then failed to honor the extension,
thereby preventing the appellees from running for office. The trial court held that
the Election Board had indeed violated the appellees' due process rights.
After reviewing the United States Supreme Court's holding in Talton v.
Mayes'67 and Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, ' the court acknowledged that
"neither the Ponca Tribe nor its Election Board are [sic] restricted by the due
process provisions of the U.S. Constitution." 169 The court then examined the
passage of the ICRA, concluding that the due process provision of the ICRA
does perceive a cause of action by parties aggrieved by tribal governments.
However, "[t]he only federal remedy under the ICRA is habeas corpus ... ""0
Echoing the sentiments of other tribal courts, the court then recognized the
163. Baldy, Sr., 22 Indian L. Rptr. at 6016 (quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank &
Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1949) (omission in original)).
164. Id.
165. Each of the following cases was decided by a different tribal court. For reasons of
clarity, the remaining cases will be grouped by region where appropriate.
166. 1 Okla. Tribal Ct. Rptr. 209 (Ponca Ct. Indian App. 1988).
167. 163 U.S. 376 (1896); see supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Talton.
168. 436 U.S. 49 (1978); see supra notes 74-95 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Martinez.
169. Snake, I Okla. Tribal Ct. Rptr. at 226.
170. Id. at 227.
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practice of looking to federal courts for guidance, while emphasizing that federal
interpretations are not dispositive in tribal courts. With perhaps the clearest
explication of tribal court autonomy of any of the cases examined, the court
stated:
When analyzing due process claims, it is important to note that the Indian
nations have formulated their own notions of due process and equal
protection in compliance with both aboriginal and modem tribal law. Indian
tribes, whose legal traditions are rooted in more informal traditions and
customs, are markedly different from English common law countries, upon
which the United States' notions of due process are founded. In fact, some
Indian tribes have gone beyond the provisions of the ICRA, and have enacted
more comprehensive rights within the tribal constitutional framework for
tribal citizens and other persons subject to a tribe's jurisdiction.'
The court then warned of blindly applying foreign concepts of due process:
When entering the arena of due process in the context of an Indian tribe,
courts should not simply rely upon ideas of due process rooted in the anglo-
American system and then attempt to apply these concepts to tribal
governments as if they were states or the federal government. That is not to
say that the general concepts of due process analysis with regard to state and
federal governments are wholly inapplicable to Indian governments, but these
precedents are certainly not dispositive nor controlling in the tribal context.
One should tread lightly when analyzing the scope and nature of tribal
sovereignty and not make assumptions based upon a history and legal
tradition that might be entirely foreign to an Indian nation.... Accordingly,
we must look to the tribal law of the Poncas, not vague notions of federal and
state due process, to determine not only the source of a right to sue but
ultimately what process is due to the plaintiffs in this matter.'
After examining the Election Ordinance, the court determined that "Ponca Tribal
law ... clearly evinces the creation of a due process right."'7  Thus, the court
held that the appellants had violated the appellees' due process rights.
The Citizen Band Potawatomi Supreme Court addressed the tribal application
of the ICRA in the case of Kinslow v. Business Committee. "7 At issue in the case
was the removal from office of the tribal Business Committee's Vice-Chairman
for misconduct. After a hearing at which the removal was upheld, the former
Vice-Chairman appealed, alleging that his removal violated his constitutional
rights to due process. Comparing tribal powers of removal of public officers to
other cultures' views on removal of officers, the court commented:
In our context however, these Euro-Middle-Eastern traditions, the English
common law, and to a large extent the Anglo-American legal system are
foreign to the Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Oklahoma which has
existed ... since time immemorial. The removal of Tribal leaders, who in
their actions violate the responsibilities and trust incumbent upon their
positions, has traditionally been within the authority of the Potawatomi
people exercised according to Tribal law. 7s
171. Id. at 230 (citation omitted).
172. Id. at 230-31 (emphasis in original).
173. Id. at 232.
174. 1 Okla. Tribal Ct. Rptr. 174 (Citizen Band Potawatomi 1988).
175. Id at 182-83.
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Similar to the expression made by other tribes regarding tribal use of federal
standards, the court further noted:
Although the separation of powers expressed in the Constitution is not the
same as that in Anglo-American law, the removal provisions [in the tribal
constitution] are somewhat akin to the expulsion and impeachment clauses
of the United States Constitution. . . . Thus, while the Citizen Band
Potawatomi Tribe of Oklahoma and this Court are not bound by or subject to
the Constitution of the United States, certain aspects of the precedents of
these legal systems will be useful to our inquiry and perhaps persuasive.'76
This court, like other tribal courts, stressed that the rights at issue stem from the
tribal constitution and not the federal government or the ICRA. But, unlike other
tribal courts, this court actually questioned the applicability of the ICRA to the
tribe at all, stating:
Further, while it may be arguable whether the Indian Civil Rights Act is
applicable to this Tribe under its treaties, the incorporation of fundamentally
similar provisions in the Constitution of the Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian
Tribe of Oklahoma provides the foundation for our initial inquiry.'
Ultimately, the court found that all the tribal constitutional due process
requirements had been met in the removal procedures: "The concept of due
process entails fair treatment under law, a right to notice and some opportunity
to be heard.... [The appellant] has been accorded the procedural process which
is due under the [tribal] Constitution."' 7
The District Court of the Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes dealt with the role of tribal
custom and tradition in the law in In re The Sacred Arrows.'79 Although this case
did not concern directly a due process claim, the court's comments on the role
of custom in tribal law bear strongly on the reasoning behind the United States
Supreme Court's vision in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez. 8 ' According to the
Court in Martinez, tribal courts should be the primary, and in most cases sole,
arbiter of individual Indian civil rights claims because only tribal courts can
apply those civil rights with sufficient sensitivity towards tribal custom and
tradition.
Sacred Arrows concerned an ownership dispute over sacred artifacts. The
court was faced with a question of which law to apply in resolving the
dispute-traditional or modern. Applying modem legal precepts, the court would
weigh the evidence and determine the rightful owner of the sacred arrows. In this
instance, however, traditional dispute resolution called for a different tack. By
the traditional procedure, the Headsmen, Chiefs, and Cheyenne tribal members
themselves would meet at a neutral site and resolve the matter "in a peaceful and
responsible manner. '
' g
176. Id. at 183 (citations omitted).
177. Id. (citation omitted).
178. Id. at 189.
179. 3 Okla. Tribal Ct. Rptr. 332 (Cheyenne-Arapaho Dist. Ct. 1990).
180. 436 U.S. 49 (1978); see supra notes 74-95 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Martinez.
181. In re The SacredArrows, 3 Okla. Tribal Ct. Rptr. at 337.
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Deciding that the dispute should be resolved by traditional procedures and not
by judicial fiat, the tribal court noted the important differences between tribal
courts' roles in Indian societies and non-Indian decisionmakers' roles in non-
Indian societies. The court stated:
[T]ribal courts cannot merely simulate the state and federal courts in
interpreting and applying tribal laws. The Tribal Court has the duty of
incorporating centuries of customs and traditions within the framework of the
new [tribal] Constitution. As in this case, it is not an easy task. Applying the
Tribal Code of Laws to a traditional and religious conflict results in tension
and conflict between the Tribal Code of Laws and traditional customs and
traditions. Because of these dilemmas, Anglo-American concepts of fairness
and civil rights are sometimes inappropriate, in their raw form, to Indian
communities. These concepts can be applied only in conjunction with the
unique cultural, social, and political attributes of the Indian heritage." 2
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez speaks exactly and precisely to this scenario.
Where cultural heritage is relevant to dispute resolution, tribal courts should
meld modem court practices with the tribe's traditional notions ofjustice. This
case, more than any other case examined, reflects a successful application of
Martinez.
E. Other Tribes in the Pacific Northwest..3
In 1987, the Squaxin Island Tribal Court addressed the role of due process and
the influence of tribal culture in the law in Squaxin Island Tribe v. Johns. 4 In
that case, Isaac Johns was charged with distributing alcohol to a child under 21
years of age in violation of the Squaxin Island Tribal Code of Laws. After
requesting a jury trial at his arraignment, the defendant twice failed to appear for
scheduled jury trials. The court ordered the defendant to appear for trial on a
third occasion, but ordered a bench trial to be held."'
Unlike the right to a jury trial under the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, the ICRA provides for a jury trial only upon request. ' 6 At issue
before the court was whether the order for a bench trial violated the defendant's
due process rights guaranteed by the ICRA. In holding that the defendant's due
process rights had not been violated, the court stressed the difference between
the ICRA and federal civil rights. According to the court:
Although the defendant requested a jury trial at arraignment, the court
finds that the defendant subsequently waived his right to trial by jury by
182. Id. at 337-38.
183. The following group of cases illustrating the tribal application of due process notions
all are located in the State of Washington. The grouping does not indicate cultural
homogeneity, but for analytical purposes, a regional grouping again facilitates conceptual
comprehension.
184. 15 Indian L. Rptr. 6010 (Squaxin Island Tribal Ct. 1987).
185. Id.
186. Id The ICRA provides in pertinent part: "No Indian Tribe in exercising the power of
self-government shall . . . deny to any person accused of an offense punishable by
imprisonment the right, upon request, to a trial by jury of not less than six persons." 25 U.S.C.
§ 1302(10) (1994).
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knowingly and voluntarily failing to appear on two occasions without
justification after assurances of appearance were made to the court. This does
not violate the defendant's right of due process since, unlike due process
under the Bill of Rights to the U.S. Constitution, which is intended solely to
safeguard individuals, due process under the Indian Civil Rights Act is
intended to serve a dual purpose-affording protection to individuals while,
at the same time, protecting tribal governmental authority. Where
governmental interests of a tribe are implicated, the ICRA permits a more
flexible interpretation of due process than its constitutional counterpart." 7
Applying this balancing test of individual protection versus protection of tribal
governmental authority to the immediate case, the court stated:
The court, on two occasions, notified and afforded the defendant the
opportunity for trial by jury. Arranging and preparing for the trial and
summoning the jurors was done at considerable expense to the court, its staff,
and the tribe. The defendant did not avail himself of that right, but, instead
absented himself from the proceedings on both occasions. In light of the
balancing of tribal interests under the Indian Civil Rights Act, the court finds
that the defendant has waived or forfeited his opportunity for ajury trial.' 8
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez relegated civil rights protection to tribal courts
so that those courts could protect Indian societies in ways that federal courts
could not, while still protecting individual Indians. In this case, the Squaxin
Island court accepted the Martinez invitation at the expense of the interests of the
individual.
In Lummi Indian Tribe v. Edwards,' 9 the Lummi Tribal Court of Appeals
entertained an argument by a defendant convicted at trial of driving under the
influence of intoxicating liquor or narcotic drugs. The defendant appealed her
conviction on the grounds that the delay of approximately eighteen months
between her arraignment and trial violated her ICRA guaranteed right to a speedy
trial 9 and due process. Noting that the right to a speedy and public trial had
never been completely defined in Lummi courts, the court stated:
The court knows of no rule or law of the Lummi Indian Tribe which
automatically requires the dismissal of charges because of the lapse of 18
months between arrest and arraignment and trial on the charges. Further, such
a lapse cannot justify dismissal of criminal charges without a finding of
prejudice to the defendant in proceeding with the trial and a finding that the
defendant was not at fault in causing the delay.1
9
'
As have other tribes, the Lummi Tribal Court of Appeals, in the context of this
due process claim, differentiated the ICRA provisions from the Federal Bill of
Rights:
The court of appeals does recognize that the Indian Civil Rights Act does
provide for the rights comparable to the United States Bill of Rights and the
187. Johns, 15 Indian L. Rptr. at 6011.
188. Id.
189. 16 Indian L. Rptr. 6005 (Lummi Tribal Ct. App. 1988).
190. The ICRA provides in pertinent part: "No Indian Tribe in exercising the powers of self-
government shall... deny to any person in a criminal proceeding the right to a speedy and
public trial." 25 U.S.C. § 1302(6) (1994).
191. Edwards, 16 Indian L. Rptr. at 6007.
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fourteenth amendment. Though there is similarity in language of both the
ICRA and the Bill of Rights and the fourteenth amendment, the meaning and
application of the ICRA must necessarily be somewhat different than the
established Anglo-American legal meaning and application of the Bill of
Rights on federal and state governments.
But even the most liberal interpretation of the Bill of Rights, fourteenth
amendment, and Indian Civil Rights Act, does not require the court of
appeals to dismiss the charges against the appellant.., where the appellant
failed to demonstrate to the court of appeals that she would be prejudiced by
proceeding with the trial. 92
Like previous tribal cases examined, the Lummi court never explicitly discussed
the differences between tribal interpretations of civil rights and federal
interpretations. Such an explicit definition is likely impossible, as due process
rights in general do not lend themselves readily to precise definition.'93 Most
importantly for the purposes of this analysis, the Lummi court acknowledged the
necessity of differing from federal court applications in tribal courts.
Stepetin, III v. Nisqually Indian Community'94 further explicates the
recognition by tribal judges of the importance of preserving traditional mores in
tribal courts. In this case, the court held that a defendant's right to a speedy trial
was not violated, but that the tribal law which authorized the tribal court to apply
state law where it did not conflict with tribal law was impermissibly vague.
Concurring in part and dissenting in part,'95 the tribal court's Chief Justice Irvin
discussed at length the hybridization of traditional law and Anglo-American
jurisprudence. Chief Justice Irvin stated:
The Nisqually Tribal Court has come to take on aspects of U.S.
jurisprudence because of the tribe's quasi-sovereign status. The law of Anglo-
American society is preserved and transmitted in writings, rather than in the
oral manner customary to tribal people. Due to the superimposition of Anglo-
American written law over tribal oral custom and tradition, the Nisqually
Tribe has adopted many of the procedural forms of federal and state tribunals,
as well as some substantive provisions.'96
With more candor than most tribal judges display when commenting upon Indian
and non-Indian jurisprudential relations, the Chief Justice then warned of
applying non-Indian concepts of justice at all in tribal forums, even when
codified by the tribes:
Tribal statutes which have been adopted in derogation to tribal tradition
should be regarded with caution. Just because tribal communities have
sometimes given paper recognition to non-Indian practices and Anglo-
American law principles in their laws does not necessarily mean that such
apparent adoption of non-Indian legal concepts and practices should be taken
192. Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
193. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 107, § 13.1, at 510.
194. 20 Indian L. Rptr. 6049 (Nisqually Ct. App. 1993).
195. The specific holding in this case, as in others, is ultimately marginal to the analysis
here. The main focus is on the tribal courts' conceptions of due process rights. See supra note
120.
196. Stepetin, 20 Indian L. Rptr. at 6052 (citation omitted).
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at face value. Tribal practices and traditions have always been oral, and it is
very rare that any tribe intends to supplant these with a formal writing.
97
Pointing out that tribal courts are historically more informal forums, though still
protective of the needs of the tribe and providing for order in the society, the
Chief Justice commented:
[T]he court must be fundamentally fair and evenly address the needs of the
tribal community in order to maintain legitimacy and respect.
The relational aspect of tribal courts, in which the tribal court serves as a
dispute resolution forum for a tribal community which consists of related
families, is an important way in which the function of tribal courts differs
from that of non-Indian jurisprudence. Rigid rules, fashioned as precedent
for adjudications but ignoring the internal dynamics of the tribal community,
may not serve justice at all. In contrast, equitable considerations and
procedures allowing flexibility in dispute resolutions may often be more
responsive to the relational needs of the tribal community. 9 '
Later in his opinion, Chief Justice Irvin discussed the imposition of the ICRA's
civil rights protections on Indian culture, specifically mentioning due process.
In so doing, the Chief Justice cautioned against viewing all tribes as identical;
each has distinct characteristics making the imposition of Anglo-American values
on Indian society even more complex and tenuous. The Chief Justice stated:
[T]he crossover of a non-Indian legal right into Indian Country is not a
simple one....
In the interpretation and determination of due process rights under ICRA,
each tribe must be treated with regard to its own individual composition and
territory. In many cases, large tribes with large reservations have adopted the
Federal Rules of Procedure and/or have incorporated state substantive laws
into their codes. Case law from these tribal courts does not necessarily fit
smaller reservations with strongly integrated communities, tribes with a
different economic base and practices, or tribes with more relaxed procedures
or simplified law and order codes.'99
These statements beg the holding of Martinez. Though the ICRA, and even the
establishment of tribal courts in the image of Anglo-American courts, inevitably
altered and imposed upon tribal cultures, Chief Justice Irvin echoes the United
States Supreme Court's sentiments in Martinez-tribal courts should be allowed
to interpret civil rights with cultural traditions in mind.
Finally, the Port Gamble S'Klallam Court of Appeals addressed the tribal
application of due process rights in In re the Welfare ofD.D. 2 In August, 1988,
an order of Indian guardianship was filed appointing the maternal grandmother
as the guardian of a minor. Five years later, the child's father petitioned the court
for guardianship of the child and the court granted him guardianship.
Subsequently, the maternal grandmother filed suit claiming a violation of her
procedural due process rights. After acknowledging that the maternal
197. Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
198. Id. at 6052-53 (emphasis added).
199. Id. at 6053.
200. 22 Indian L. Rptr. 6020 (Port Gamble S'Klallam Ct. App. 1994).
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grandmother was entitled to procedural guarantees in this case, the court
discussed what due process entails in a tribal context:
While the meaning of due process under the Indian Civil Rights Act is similar
to due process as defined under the United States Constitution, it is different.
An Indian tribal court's interpretation and application of due process
represents the unique tribal sovereign, its distinctive tradition, culture and
mores.
201
Further refining the meaning of due process in a tribal setting however, this
court, like other tribal courts examined, looked to other courts' interpretations
for guidance, specifically the U.S. Supreme Court:
While federal, state or other tribal law is not binding authority upon this
court, such authority can be used as guidance. "'The fundamental requisite
of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard.' The hearing must be 'at
a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner."'
Due process requires notice, the opportunity to be heard in a full and fair
hearing, to call witnesses on your behalf, to cross-examine witnesses and to
be heard before a [sic] impartial decision maker.212
As in previous cases examined, this tribal court expressly reserved the right
and realized the need for tribal differentiation from federal interpretations.
Because this case involved only the apparently generic requirement of the
opportunity to be heard, the tribal court interpretation paralleled the words of the
U.S. Supreme Court. As in other cases, the tribal court modeled its
interpretations of civil rights provisions after federal interpretations at its
discretion, but modeled it nonetheless. The next Part will attempt to draw
conclusions about the success of the Supreme Court's vision in Martinez and the
meaning of due process concepts in Indian culture based upon the previous
examination of tribal court opinions.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
As previously noted, perhaps the most striking point learned in the course of
this Project has been the infrequency with which tribal courts are faced with
issues concerning the civil rights provisions contained in Title II of the ICRA.
While the Project only examined the opinions of tribal courts with the resources
or good fortune to have their opinions published in some forum, the tracks left
by those courts, though scant, suggest several interesting implications about the
status of tribal courts, the role of tribal tradition in the law, and the meaning of
due process in a tribal setting.
201. Id. at 6020.
202. Id. (quoting Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 257 (1969)).
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A. What Due Process Means to Tribes
The U.S. Congress, through the ICRA, and the U.S. Supreme Court, through
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, have given tribes the power to interpret
individual civil rights in two ways. "First, except in habeas corpus cases, the
tribe alone interprets the statute's substantive meaning; no federal official has
any input. Second, the statute is interpreted on a tribe-by-tribe basis, without any
nationwide body insisting on uniformity. As a result ... one would anticipate
that the ICRA's meaning varies substantially across Indian Country."2"3 The due
process cases examined suggest, contrary to the anticipated substantial
differences, that the variances in due process notions across Indian Country
occur only at the margins.
All of the tribal courts acknowledge, to varying degrees, that due process
essentially means fundamental fairness. The cases examined suggest that, while
tribes may apply due process with tradition and culture in mind, due process
means fundamental fairness in both a procedural and substantive sense. In a
procedural sense, for both criminal and civil cases, due process centers on the
right to notice and the opportunity to have one's argument heard by a fair and
impartial decisionmaker. Even when the tribal courts, in the cases examined,
address substantive due process claims, the determinative factor in whether a due
process violation has occurred is ultimately whether the litigant has been
afforded the dictates of fairness. In comparison, these tribal courts do not differ
greatly from their federal counterparts. When tribal courts do apply due process
differently than Anglo-American courts, they generally do so in the context of
decreasing formality and increasing discretion for tribal judges to arrive at the
broad maxim of "justice." Greater degrees of informality and greater power to
apply principles of equity, and thus depart from rigid legal precepts, was
acknowledged by several of the courts examined. 0 4
Even when they apply principles of due process in ways that mirror Anglo-
American courts, the tribal courts remain almost vehemently aware of their
ability to differ at their own discretion to protect cultural traditions and tribal
sovereignty. The tribal courts examined seem willing to use federal principles
where necessary to fill a gap in tribal law, or simply where helpful, but invariably
point out that federal principles and precedents do not bind them. Tribal courts
preserve the right to vary from Anglo-American interpretations because
sometimes, as one commentator stated, "the norms embodied within the Bill of
Rights, and partially incorporated into the Indian Civil Rights Act, while
reflective of European culture, are alien to the original social structures of Indian
tribes. 2 °5
203. Williams, supra note 4, at 497.
204. See, e.g., supra notes 194-98 and accompanying text (discussing Chief Justice Irvin's
concurrence in Stepetin, III v. Nisqually Indian Community, 20 Indian L. Rptr. 6049
(Nisqually Ct. App. 1993)).
205. Ferguson, supra note 20, at 298.
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B. Reason for Tribal-Federal Similarities of Application
One obvious reason that the tribal application of the due process clause might
seem to reflect Anglo-American standards may be seen in the Navajo cases. As
stated repeatedly in the Navajo court opinions, the notion of due process was not
taught to the Navajos by the federal government through the ICRA, nor was it
developed with the advent of an Anglo-American court system; Navajo culture
has always valued fundamental fairness notions in dispute resolution.2 16 Again,
according to the Navajo Supreme Court, "[t]he concept of due process was not
brought to the Navajo Nation by the Indian Civil Rights Act. The Navajo people
have an established custom of notifying all the parties in a controversy and
allowing them ... an opportunity to present and defend their positions. 2 7
Because their culture and traditions value notions of due process similar to
Anglo-American notions, Navajo application of due process appears similar to
the Anglo-American application.
Other tribes, however, do not traditionally value notions of due process, or
civil rights generally, consistent with Anglo-American values. Given the vast
number of tribes and widely varying cultures, generalizations about Indians are
difficult to make.0 8 One theme, however, that runs commonly throughout the
literature on Indian culture is the different social structure and methods of
dispute resolution traditionally maintained by many tribes.20 9 While the concept
of individual civil rights pervades Anglo-American thought, Indian societies
often value social homogeneity above all else. As two leading scholars in the
field of Indian law, Professors Vine Deloria and Clifford Lytle, noted:
Civil rights is an old and familiar topic to most Americans. Our social contract
theory of government limits the exercise of arbitrary and capricious authority over
individuals by the civil rights protections of the Bill of Rights. We expect the equal
protection of the laws and the protection of due process in any proceeding that
affects our liberty or our property. At least part of our fear of government intrusion
is based upon the fact that we are not personally related to or responsible for those
who exercise political authority over us....
Indian tribal societies had no concept of civil rights because every member
of the society was related, by blood or clan responsibilities, to every other
member. There was no pretense that the state existed to prevent injuries to its
members by other members.210
Perhaps then, mandating that tribes who may lack a cultural backdrop of civil
rights or due process enforce civil rights under the ICRA leaves tribes no
206. See supra part VII.A for a discussion of the Navajo treatment of the due process clause.
207. Begay v. Navajo Nation, 15 Indian L. Rptr. 6032, 6034 (Navajo 1988) (citation
omitted).
208. On this problem, one commentator noted: "[w]hen dealing with a wide variety of Indian
groups on a continental scale, any generality must submit to numerous qualifications."
Brandfon, supra note 36, at 995.
209. For articles commenting on the different social structures of many Indian societies, see
Brandfon, supra note 36; Burnett, supra note 43; de Raismes, supra note 6.
210. DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note 17, at 200.
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alternative but to look to Anglo-American courts for interpretive guidance. Thus,
even the Martinez holding, making tribal courts virtually the sole arbiters of
Indian civil rights, does not free the tribes from Anglo-American normative
constraints. Basically, if tribes have no cultural concept of individual civil rights
as has been suggested, telling those tribes that they may interpret the ICRA with
sensitivity for cultural traditions is moot. In that instance, the imposition of the
ICRA alone may have effectively required the tribal courts to look to Anglo-
American courts.
Tribal courts refuse, however, to allow this inherent imposition to destroy their
ability to render decisions in a traditional cultural context. Each tribe expressly
recognizes its ability to differ. For example, commenting on the use of Anglo-
American or any other precedent, the Hoopa Valley Court of Appeals stated,
"[e]ven though the decisions of federal, state, or other tribal courts are not
controlling in this court, such decisions can be used as guidance in helping us
address these issues."' 21' Because of the incompatibility of some civil rights
concepts to Indian tribal cultures, tribal courts reserve the right to differ from
Anglo-American courts, even in cases where they choose not to differ.
According to Deloria and Lytle, the ICRA is conceptually flawed in that it
assumes that tribal courts stand in the same relationship to both tribal citizens
and the tribal government as do the federal courts to the American citizenry and
the federal government.21 2 Whereas "Itiraditional Indian society understood itself
as a complex of responsibilities and duties," wrote Deloria and Lytle:
The ICRA merely transposed this belief into a society based on rights against
the government and eliminated any sense of responsibility that the people
might have felt for one another .... People did not have to confront one
another before their community and resolve their problems; they only had to
file suit in tribal court.
213
The ICRA imposed liberal-democratic notions of individual civil rights upon
many communitarian societies which previously lacked such concepts.
The U.S. Supreme Court's Martinez decision, however, has been lauded as an
effort by one branch of the federal government to soften the conceited impact of
the ICRA.214 Seemingly, as evidenced by this examination of tribal disposition
of due process claims, the tribal courts value the allowance to differ even if they
rarely express that ability.2t5 From this perspective, the Martinez vision of tribal
court control of civil rights so as to protect, as much as possible, tribal
sovereignty, appears to have been successful. Thus, the Anglo-American values
211. Hoopa Valley Hous. Auth. v. Gerstner, 22 Indian L. Rptr. 6002, 6005 (Hoopa Ct. App.
1993).
212. DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note 17, at 213.
213. Id.
214. See, e.g., Brandfon, supra note 36; Ferguson, supra note 20; Lynch, supra note 24.
Other commentators have criticized Martinez as negating the positive impact of the ICRA's
civil rights protections. See, e.g., Laurence, supra note 73; Ryce, supra note 67.
215. The term "allowance" is used here to express that Congress clearly has the ability to
restrict tribal court authority or even mandate the application of federal standards. See supra
text accompanying notes 18-39 for a discussion of the origins of Congress's plenary power
over the tribes.
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of the ICRA have even been "understood by most people as a major step toward
the fulfillment of Indian self-government and, if we continue our analysis with
consistency, it was certainly a step toward more self-government. But was it what
Indians really wanted?"2'
IX. CLOSING
The federal government, unable to decide the proper course for Indian tribes
in America, has vacillated throughout history between assimilation and self-
determination, creating an often ambiguous status for tribal cultures. The
conflicting policies of the federal government are evident in the opening words
of the ICRA. In presenting the characteristics and powers of Indian tribes, the
Act says at once they are "subject to the jurisdiction of the United States," and
"recognized as possessing powers of self-government. 21 7 In an attempt to soften
the imposition of the ICRA, the United States Supreme Court in Santa Clara
Pueblo v. Martinez gave control of Indian civil rights to tribal courts. In the
period since Martinez, much has been written theorizing on the proper forum for
Indian civil rights. Almost nothing, however, has been written analyzing the
actual tribal court treatment of these issues. According to one commentator,
"Indians and non-Indians concerned with civil liberties in a tribal context should
pay more attention to this question at the level of tribal government."2 8 This
Project has attempted to elucidate the tribal courts' struggle to protect tribal
autonomy while mired in the wilderness of Anglo-American values. For tribes
with values similar to those of Anglo-American culture, application of foreign
concepts of civil rights may be accomplished without massive cultural distortion.
For tribes that do not share the same notions of civil rights, or even structure
their society in the same way, mandated application may inevitably entail a
degree of assimilation. Ultimately, only tribal self-determination will preserve
tribal culture with sensitivity. The course of tribal self-determination is both
moral and important.
216. DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note 17, at 213.
217. 25 U.S.C. § 1301(1) (1994).
218. Elmer R. Rusco, Civil Liberties Guarantees Under Tribal Law: A Survey of Civil Rights
Provisions in Tribal Constitutions, 14 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 269,299 (1990).
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